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Abstract
Herbrand structures have the advantage, computationally speaking, of being guided by the defin-
ability of all elements in them. A salient feature of the logics induced by them is that they internally
exhibit the induction scheme, thus providing a congenial, computationally-oriented framework for
formal inductive reasoning. Nonetheless, their enhanced expressivity renders any effective proof
system for them incomplete. Furthermore, the fact that they are not compact poses yet another proof-
theoretic challenge. This paper offers several layers for coping with the inherent incompleteness and
non-compactness of these logics. First, two types of infinitary proof system are introduced—one
of infinite width and one of infinite height—which manipulate infinite sequents and are sound and
complete for the intended semantics. The restriction of these systems to finite sequents induces a
completeness result for finite entailments. Then, in search of effectiveness, two finite approximations
of these systems are presented and explored. Interestingly, the approximation of the infinite-width
system via an explicit induction scheme turns out to be weaker than the effective cyclic fragment of the
infinite-height system.
1 Introduction
Herbrand structures are a particularly useful subclass of first-order structures due to their strong definitional
character. In these structures every element has a unique name, i.e. each semantical element is uniquely
definable by some closed term of the language. This strong definability property of the logic induced by
Herbrand structures offers both computational and pedagogical advantages over classical first-order logic.
For instance, it enables a convenient way of performing symbolic computations, its models can be reduced
to sets of atomic sentences, and it has a strong expressive power. It is for these reasons that Herbrand
structures are widely used in various subfields of computer science. In logic they are often used as a key
component in completeness proofs; in automated reasoning they are used for automated theorem proving
[12, 7]; in deductive databases and logic programming they provide semantics for logic programs [28, 1];
and in logic education [23] they provide a simplified semantics for first-order languages.
This paper studies the logics induced by Herbrand structures on their own merit, not solely as an
instrumental tool in subfields of artificial intelliegence and logic-related research.1 Thus, we start by
identifying the different components comprising Herbrand structures: (i) every element of the domain
has a name in the formal language; and (ii) every such name is unique. The latter property is called
“structure-definability”. Structures that satisfy only (i) are called semi-Herbrand structures, and those who
satisfy both (i) and (ii) are called Herbrand structures. We also consider the addition of equality to the
1Such line of research was suggested in [24], and the work presented here is an extension of [17].
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language, and thus obtain four variants of the logic, which we call “Herbrand logics”. Herbrand logics are
“super-classical”, in the sense that classical first-order logic is strictly contained in them.
There are some critical differences between Herbrand logics and first-order logic. First, the rich
expressive power of Herbrand logics entails that they are inherently incomplete, in the sense that there
cannot exist sound, effective proof systems for these logics that are also complete. Second, they are not
even compact and thus, for instance, from the possibly infinite set of assumptions {ϕ(t) : t ∈ cl(L)}
(where cl(L) is the set of closed terms of the language L) one can infer ∀xϕ, whereas in the general
case it cannot be inferred from any finite subset of the assumptions. Finally, while both downward
and upward Löwenheim-Skolem theorems hold for classical first-order logic, only the former holds for
Herbrand logics.2 The first two properties present major challenges in the development of a proof theory
for Herbrand logics.
Accordingly, the main contribution of this paper is in the introduction of several sequent calculi [25]
for (each of the variants of) Herbrand logics, as well as their comparison to one another. Sequent calculi
are widely used in automated reasoning, especially when one is interested in the computational aspects of
a logic (e.g., [33]). It has been employed in a variety of logical frameworks, e.g., many-valued and fuzzy
logics [30, 11], modal logics [40, 31], paraconsistent logics [4], and also logical argumentation [2].
The standard way to recover completeness for logics that are not compact is to forgo effectiveness and
develop an infinitary system (see, e.g., [37]). Thus, we present two approaches for developing infinitary
sequent calculi which are both sound and complete for the various Herbrand logics. The first is an infinite-
width system whose main component is a generalization of the ω-rule [37]. The fact that this well-known,
natural derivation rule suffices for a deductive characterization of Herbrand structures is non-trivial, as
evidenced by the construction employed in the completeness proofs. The second system is of infinite height,
i.e. a non-well-founded proof system adhering to the principle of infinite descent [8, 9, 10, 16, 18, 35, 39].
The non-compactness of the logic entails that one must allow both systems to manipulate infinite sequents.
Indeed, these systems are complete for their intended semantics. If the sequents permitted by the systems
are only finite, completeness is retained with respect to finite inferences.
In order for proof systems for Herbrand logics to serve as a baseline for useful automation in any
of the applications in computer science mentioned above one must consider effective approximations.
We present two such approximations corresponding to the two infinite approaches. Finitary and sound
approximations of the infinite-width systems are obtained by replacing the generalized ω-rule with a
generalization of its finitary counterpart, namely the standard induction rule for Peano Arithmetics [25].
For the infinite-height systems, finitary and sound approximations are obtained by restricting our attention
only to regular proofs, i.e. proofs that can be represented by finite, possibly cyclic, graphs. Interestingly,
these two natural approximations are not equivalent as we show that the cyclic subsystem is stronger than
the induction-based system.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 variants of Herbrand structures are defined,
and the semantics they induce are investigated. Sound and complete infinite-width proof systems for
Herbrand logics are introduced in Section 3, followed by the equivalent infinite-height proof systems that
are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents finitary approximations of these systems: the induction-based
system (Subsection 5.1) and the cyclic system (Subsection 5.2). Then, the latter is shown to be strictly
stronger than the former (Subsection 5.3). We conclude with Section 6, where other directions for further
research are suggested.
2Since Herbrand logics are super-classical, Lindström’s theorem (see, e.g., [21]) tells us that they cannot be both compact
and admit the downward Löwenheim-Skolem theorem. The fact that they do admit one of these properties makes Herbrand
logics closer to first-order logics than other super-classical logics.
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2 Herbrand Logics
This section is devoted to the various logics Herbrand structures induce. After the preliminary Section 2.1,
in Section 2.2 we study structures that admit two well-known variants of the Herbrand property, namely
Herbrand and semi-Herbrand structures. In Section 2.3 we add a distinguished equality symbol to the
language, and explore its effect on the results of Section 2.2.
2.1 Preliminaries
A first-order language L consists of a set of variables, the standard logical connectives ∧,∨,⊃ and ¬,
the logical quantifiers ∀ and ∃, and a signature that consists of a set func (L) of function symbols, and
a set pred (L) of predicate symbols. We use x, y, z, w (possibly with subscripts) to denote variables of
L. We also denote by consts (L) the set of 0-ary function symbols (constants), and by func+ (L) the
set func (L) \ consts (L). The arity of a function symbol f is denoted by ar(f). A term (formula) is
called closed if no free variable occurs in it, and is called open otherwise. The set of closed terms of L is
denoted by cl (L), and the set of its closed atomic formulas is denoted by catoms (L). We adopt standard
conventions for eliminating parentheses (e.g., when writing ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 ⊃ ψ rather than (ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) ⊃ ψ. We
write ϕ
{
t
x
}
to denote the formula obtained from ϕ by simultaneously substituting any free occurrence of
x in ϕ with t.
A first-order structure for L is a pair 〈D, I〉, such that D is a non-empty set and I is an interpretation
function, assigning an n-ary function (relation) over D to every n-ary function (predicate) symbol of L.
Given a first-order structure M = 〈D, I〉 for L, an M -valuation is a function v from the set of variables to
D. M -valuations are extended to be applied on arbitrary L-terms in the usual manner. The satisfaction
relation M, v |= ϕ is standardly defined. We write M |= ϕ if M, v |= ϕ for every M -valuation v.
In what follows, we fix a first-order language L which has at least one constant symbol.1 By a structure
we mean a first-order structure for L. We denote the classical satisfaction relation between structures and
formulas by |=, and its induced consequence relation by `.
2.2 Herbrand and Semi-Herbrand Structures
We start the investigation of Herbrand structures by disassembling their standard definition into its two
components: the existence of a name for every domain element, and its uniqueness.2
Definition 2.1. A structureM = 〈D, I〉 is called semi-Herbrand if for every a ∈ D there is some t ∈ cl (L)
such that I (t) = a. If for each a ∈ D, there is a unique t ∈ cl (L) such that I (t) = a, M is called a
Herbrand structure.
Since in Herbrand structures every element has a unique name, it is possible (and beneficial from a
computational point of view) to fix the domain to consist solely of these names. Thus, in the reminder
of this paper, we utilize the more common definition of a Herbrand structure, requiring that D = cl (L)
and I (t) = t for every t ∈ D. It is routine to show that every Herbrand structure is isomorphic to such a
structure.
Herbrand structures allow for an even more computationally-oriented definition, as they admit a strong
notion of definability, which we call “structure-definability”. That is, every Herbrand structure is uniquely
1Dismissing this requirement yields a Herbrand counterpart of free-logic [27].
2These two components correspond to well-known concepts from inductive reasoning: a set of operators generating a set,
and the question whether each element is generated in a unique way [22].
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determined by a set of closed atoms, by setting I (P ) = {〈t1, . . . , tn〉 ∈ cl (L)n : P (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ A} for
every predicate symbol P .3
The fact that every element in the domain has a name allows for an equivalent, more convenient
definition of quantifier semantics and of satisfaction of open formulas.
Lemma 2.2. Let M be a semi-Herbrand structure.
• M |= ∃xψ iff M |= ψ { t
x
}
for some t ∈ cl (L).
• M |= ∀xψ iff M |= ψ { t
x
}
for every t ∈ cl (L).
Definition 2.3. Let ϕ (x1, . . . , xn) be an open formula whose free variables are a subset of {x1, . . . , xn}.
An L-instance of ϕ is a formula of the form ϕ
{
t1
x1
, . . . , tn
xn
}
, where t1, . . . , tn ∈ cl (L).
Lemma 2.4. Let M be a semi-Herbrand structure. Then M |= ϕ iff M |= ϕ′ for every L-instance ϕ′ of ϕ.
The consequence relations induced by (semi-)Herbrand structures are defined as follows:
Definition 2.5. Let T ∪ {ϕ} be a set of L-formulas. T `H ϕ (T `SH ϕ) if for every (semi-) Herbrand
structure M , M |= T (i.e. M |= ψ for every ψ ∈ T ) implies M |= ϕ.
Notice that the relations `SH and `H are parametrized by the underlying language L, and the answer
to derivability questions highly depends on the identity of L. For readability, we fix an arbitrary first-order
language L as the underlying language for the rest of this paper, unless specifically stated otherwise.
The next proposition summarizes the relations between the logics that are induced by Herbrand, semi-
Herbrand and arbitrary structures. Note that the proposition assumes L does not include a distinguished
equality symbol (such languages are the subject of the next subsection).
Proposition 2.6. ` ( `SH = `H .
Proof. Since every Herbrand structure is also semi-Herbrand, and every semi-Herbrand structure is a
classical structure, we have that ` ⊆ `SH ⊆ `H . To see that ` 6= `SH , consider e.g. the case where
L consists of one constant symbol c, and a unary predicate P . Clearly, P (c) `SH ∀xP (x), whereas
P (c) 6` ∀xP (x).4 As for `SH and `H , for every semi-Herbrand structure M = 〈D, I〉, an equivalent
Herbrand structure HM = 〈cl (L) , I ′〉 can be constructed by taking I ′ (t) = t for every t ∈ cl (L), and
I ′ (P ) = {〈t1, . . . , tn〉 : 〈I (t1) , . . . , I (tn)〉 ∈ I (P )} for each predicate symbol P . It can be shown using
structural induction on the formulas of L that M and HM satisfy the same formulas.
2.3 Handling Equality
In this section we use the classical axiomatization of equality to study equality in Herbrand logics.
Throughout, we assume L includes a binary predicate symbol =, and abbreviate ¬ (s = t) by (s 6= t). A
structure M = 〈D, I〉 is called normal if I (=) is {〈a, a〉 | a ∈ D}.
Definition 2.7. `H= (`SH=) is defined similarly to `H (`SH), but is restricted to normal Herbrand (semi-
Herbrand) structures.
The addition of equality to the signature separates the consequence relations induced by Herbrand and
semi-Herbrand structures.
3This is how Herbrand structures were defined in [24].
4A more general argument was given in [24] for the proper inclusion of ` in `H , which amounts to the failure of the
compactness theorem for `H .
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Proposition 2.8. For languages with at least two distinct closed terms, `SH= ( `H= .5
Proof. For t1 and t2 two distinct closed terms we have `H= t1 6= t2, while 0SH= t1 6= t2.
Semi-Herbrand structures allow for the same axiomatization of equality that is used in classical logic.
Definition 2.9. Let Equiv = {x = x, x = y ⊃ y = x, x = y ∧ y = z ⊃ x = z}, and let E (L) be the set
consisting of the following formulas:
• x1 = y1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn = yn ⊃ f (x1, . . . , xn) = f (y1, . . . , yn) for every n-ary (n > 0) function
symbol f .
• x1 = y1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn = yn ⊃ (P (x1, . . . , xn) ⊃ P (y1, . . . , yn)) for every n-ary predicate symbol P .
Finally, let Eq (L) be the set Equiv ∪ E (L). For normal semi-Herbrand structures, we have:
Proposition 2.10. T `SH= ϕ iff T ∪ Eq (L) `SH ϕ.
Eq (L), however, is insufficient for characterizing normal Herbrand structures. For example,
`H= t1 6= t2, but Eq (L) 6`H t1 6= t2, whenever t1 and t2 are distinct closed terms. Interestingly,
in Herbrand structures, capturing equality requires also the inequalities of the language, which are suc-
cinctly described using the following inequality axioms. Together with the equality axioms above, we
obtain a variant of Clark equality theory [13].
Definition 2.11. Let inE (L) be the set consisting of the following formulas:
• f (x1, . . . , xn) 6= g (y1, . . . , ym) for every distinct function symbols f and g with arities n and m,
respectively.6
• xi 6= yi ⊃ f (x1, . . . xi, . . . , xn) 6= f (x1, . . . yi, . . . , xn) for every n-ary (n > 0) function symbol f
and 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Notice that inE (L) is determined solely by func (L). Therefore, whenever this set is finite, so is
inE (L). This is in contrast to Eq (L), which also depends on pred (L).
Example 2.12. [24] defines a theory (which is here denoted by NAT) in a language (which is here
denoted by LNAT) for arithmetics, that consists of a constant 0, a unary function s, two ternary predicate
symbols plus and times, and a binary predicate symbol equal. For this particular language, we have
inE (LNAT) = {0 6= s (x) , s (x) 6= 0, x 6= y ⊃ s (x) 6= s (y)}. These axioms, together with x = x, are
essentially the axioms that were used for the predicate equal in NAT.
Lemma 2.13. The following hold:
• inE (L) `H s 6= t for every distinct closed terms s and t.
• Let M be a Herbrand structure. M |= inE (L) ∪ {x = x} iff M is normal.
• Let M be a semi-Herbrand structure. M |= inE (L) iff M is Herbrand.
With inE (L), we obtain the following counterpart of Proposition 2.10.
Proposition 2.14. T `H= ϕ iff T ∪ inE (L) ∪ {x = x} `H ϕ.
5If the language has only one closed term the consequence relations are identical.
6Note that f and g may be constant symbols.
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Figure 1: Rules of the Basic Calculus G
(id)
Γ, ϕ⇒ ϕ,∆ (weak)
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′,∆ (cut)
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆
(∧⇒) Γ, ϕ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∧ ψ ⇒ ∆ (⇒∧)
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ Γ⇒ ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ϕ ∧ ψ,∆
(∨⇒) Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆ Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ ∨ ψ ⇒ ∆ (⇒∨)
Γ⇒ ϕ, ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ϕ ∨ ψ,∆
(⊃⇒) Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ ⊃ ψ ⇒ ∆ (⇒⊃)
Γ, ϕ⇒ ψ,∆
Γ⇒ ϕ ⊃ ψ,∆
(¬⇒) Γ⇒ ϕ,∆
Γ,¬ϕ⇒ ∆ (⇒¬)
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ¬ϕ,∆
(∀⇒) Γ, ϕ{
t
x
} ⇒ ∆
Γ, ∀xϕ⇒ ∆ (⇒∃)
Γ⇒ ϕ{ t
x
},∆
Γ⇒ ∃xϕ,∆
Corollary 2.15. T `H= ϕ iff T ∪ inE (L) `SH= ϕ.
To conclude this section, we make a brief remark about the axiomatization of arithmetics within
the framework of Herbrand structures. The theory NAT, mentioned in Example 2.12, provides an
axiomatization that categorically characterizes the natural numbers under Herbrand structures. This
axiomatization is actually (the relational version of) Peano Arithmetics (PA) without the induction scheme,
called Π2 (see, e.g., [29]). Robinson [34] added to this system the axiom ∀x.x 6= 0 ⊃ ∃y.x = s (y), thus
forming his famous system Q. When only considering Herbrand structures for LNAT, this additional axiom
is valid, and thus the induction-free part of PA suffices. Moreover, the induction scheme itself is also valid
in such structures. Therefore, Π2, Q and PA are equivalent in Herbrand structures.
It was already shown in [24] that `H is not recursively enumerable, and the same holds for the other
variants of Herbrand logics (due to the above translations between them). Consequently, Herbrand logics
are inherently incomplete. Nevertheless, as shown below, there are natural formal systems which allow for
infinitary proofs, that are sound and complete for Herbrand logics.
3 Infinite-width Systems
In this section we provide derivation systems for Herbrand logics that do not make use of free variables.
This provides a proof-theoretical counterpart of Lemma 2.2, in which an alternative semantics were given
for quantified formulas without using free variables.
3.1 Manipulating Infinite Sequents
The proof-theoretic mechanism we use is that of sequent calculi [25]. To obtain completeness for our
systems, however, the standard definition of a sequent must be relaxed to allow infinite sequents.
Definition 3.1. A sequent is an expression of the form Γ⇒ ∆, where Γ and ∆ are (possibly infinite) sets
of formulas. A sequent containing only closed formulas is called closed; otherwise, it is called open.
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Figure 2: Derivation Rules for Herbrand and semi-Herbrand Logics
(⇒∀)H
{
Γ⇒ ϕ{ t
x
}
,∆ : t ∈ cl (L)}
Γ⇒ ∀xϕ,∆ (∃⇒)H
{
Γ, ϕ
{
t
x
}⇒ ∆ : t ∈ cl (L)}
Γ,∃xϕ⇒ ∆
(PM1)
Γ⇒ ϕ{ s
x
}
,∆
Γ, s = t⇒ ϕ{ t
x
}
,∆
(PM2)
Γ⇒ ϕ{ t
x
}
,∆
Γ, s = t⇒ ϕ{ s
x
}
,∆
(⇒=)
Γ⇒ t = t,∆ t ∈ cl (L) (=⇒) Γ, s = t⇒ ∆ s 6= t ∈ cl (L)
Let LK denote a variant of Gentzen’s calculus for classical logic [25], in which sequents are taken
to be pairs of finite sets, rather than pairs of lists (in particular, contraction, expansion and permutation
are not needed). Denote by G the calculus that consists of the rules in Figure 1. Derivations in G are
restricted to closed (possibly infinite) sequents. Note that the rules of G are obtained from those of LK
by dismissing (⇒∀) and (∃⇒) (which are the ∀-introduction rule and ∃-elimination rule, respectively),
replacing the axiom ϕ⇒ ϕ by Γ, ϕ⇒ ϕ,∆ for every closed sequent Γ, ϕ⇒ ϕ,∆, and also replacing the
two original weakening rules by the following single weakening rule.
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ,Γ′ ⇒ ∆′,∆
The key idea behind capturing the essence of Herbrand logics in a formal proof system is to formalize
the syntactic restriction on the domain. This is obtained by replacing the standard (⇒∀) rule by a language-
based introduction rule for ∀, which is a generalization of the ω-rule employed in some proof systems
for arithmetic (see, e.g., [37]). Similar modification is required in the (∃⇒) rule. The adjustments in the
axiom and weakening rules allow the introduction of infinite sequents.
Definition 3.2. We define the following proof systems using the derivation rules in Figs. 1 and 2.
1. GH = G+ (⇒∀)H + (∃⇒)H .
2. GSH= = GH + (⇒=) + (PM1) + (PM2).
3. GH= = GH + (⇒=) + (=⇒).
Note that (PM1) and (PM2) are not included in GH= since they are derivable using (⇒=) and (=⇒).
Let G be one of the three calculi in the above definition. A derivation of a sequent s in G is a (possibly
infinite) tree with a finite height, rooted with s, in which every node in the tree is the result of an application
of some rule of X on the set of its predecessors. We write `G s if there is a derivation of s in G.
It is important to note that every derivation in the above calculi does not contain occurrences of free
variables. Also note that, in general, the above calculi are not effective as they allow for both infinite
derivations (by using (⇒∀)H or (∃⇒)H when cl (L) is infinite) and infinite sequents (by using an instance
of (id) with an infinite sequent, or introducing one with (weak)).
First we show that all three calculi extend LK. For this we consider L-instances of sequents.
Definition 3.3. A substitution is a function σ assigning an element of cl (L) to every variable. Given a
formula ϕ, ϕσ is obtained from ϕ by substituting every free occurrence of a variable x with σ (x). An L-
instance of a sequent Γ⇒ ∆ is any sequent of the form Γσ ⇒ ∆σ for some σ, whereXσ = {ϕσ | ϕ ∈ X}.
Proposition 3.4. Let s be a finite closed sequent derivable in LK. Then s is derivable in GH .
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Proof. Denote by (Γ⇒ ∆)σ the sequent Γσ ⇒ ∆σ (see Definition 3.3). We prove by induction on the
length of the proof of s in LK that `GH sσ for every substitution σ and any finite (possibly open) sequent
s. Proposition 3.4 then immediately follows.
1. The cases where s was derived using a structural rule (id, cut, weakening) or an introduction rule of a
propositional connective are routine. We explicitly show the case where the last rule in the derivation
of s was (⊃⇒): in this case, s has the form Γ, ϕ ⊃ ψ ⇒ ∆, and there are shorter derivations of
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆ and Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆. Let σ be a substitution. By the induction hypothesis, `GH Γσ ⇒ ϕσ,∆σ
and `GH Γσ, ψσ ⇒ ∆σ, and thus `GH sσ.
2. If s was derived by introducing ∀ on the right side, then s has the form Γ⇒ ∀xϕ,∆, and there is
a shorter derivation of Γ⇒ ϕ{ y
x
}
,∆ for some variable y that does not occur free in Γ ∪∆. Let
σ be a substitution. We prove that `GH Γσ ⇒ (∀xϕ)σ ,∆σ. For every t ∈ cl (L), denote by σy 7→t
the substitution defined by: σy 7→t(z) = t if z = y, and σy 7→t(z) = σ(z) otherwise. By the induction
hypothesis, `GH Γσt ⇒
(
ϕ
{
y
x
})σt
,∆σt for every t ∈ cl (L). Now, let t ∈ cl (L). Since y does not
occur free in Γ ∪∆, we must have Γσt = Γσ and ∆σt = ∆σ. Moreover, (ϕ{ y
x
})σt
=
(
ϕ
{
t
x
})σ.
Denote by ϕ′ the formula obtained from ϕ by substituting all free occurrences of variables z in
ϕ by σ (z), except for x, which is left free in ϕ′. Since t is a closed term,
(
ϕ
{
t
x
})σ
= ϕ′
{
t
x
}
.
Thus for every t ∈ cl (L), we have `GH Γσ ⇒ ϕ′
{
t
x
}
,∆σ. Using (⇒∀)H , we obtain that
`GH Γσ ⇒ ∀xϕ′,∆σ. Clearly, ∀xϕ′ = (∀xϕ)σ, and so we have `GH Γσ ⇒ (∀xϕ)σ ,∆σ.
3. If s was derived by introducing ∀ on the left side, then s has the form Γ,∀xϕ⇒ ∆, and there is a
shorter derivation of Γ, ϕ
{
α
x
}⇒ ∆ for some (possibly open) term α that can be substituted for x
in ϕ. Let σ be a substitution. We prove that `GH Γσ, (∀xϕ)σ ⇒ ∆σ. By the induction hypothesis,
`GH Γσ,
(
ϕ
{
α
x
})σ ⇒ ∆σ. Let ασ denote the closed term obtained from α by substituting every
free occurrence of a variable z in α by σ (z). Let ϕ′ be defined as in the previous case. Then(
ϕ
{
α
x
})σ
= ϕ′
{
ασ
x
}
. Thus we have `GH Γσ, ϕ′
{
ασ
x
}⇒ ∆σ. ασ is a closed term, and thus can be
substituted for x in ϕ′. Using (∀⇒), we obtain `GH Γσ,∀xϕ′ ⇒ ∆σ. Clearly, ∀xϕ′ = (∀xϕ)σ, and
so we have `GH Γσ, (∀xϕ)σ ⇒ ∆σ.
4. The cases where the last rule in the derivation introduces ∃ are symmetric.
We now prove that all three calculi are sound and complete with respect to their corresponding
Herbrand logics. We begin with the soundness results.
Definition 3.5. Let M be a structure for L and s = Γ⇒ ∆ a closed sequent. M |= s if M 6|= ϕ for some
ϕ ∈ Γ or M |= ψ for some ψ ∈ ∆. We write `GH s if M |= s for every Herbrand structure M for L, and
use this notation similarly for `GSH= and `GH= .
Theorem 3.6 (Soundness). Let s be a closed sequent. The following hold:
1. `GH s only if `H s.
2. `GH= s only if `H= s.
3. `GSH= s only if `SH= s.
Proof.
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1. Let s be a closed sequent, and assume `GH s. We prove that every Herbrand structure is a model
of s. The proof is carried out by induction on the proof tree of s in GH . The base cases are trivial,
and the rules in G are proven to be sound just as in the classical case. We here consider the (⇒∀)H
rule. The case for (∃⇒)H is symmetric. Let Γ ⇒ ∀xϕ,∆ and
{
Γ⇒ ϕ{ t
x
}
,∆ : t ∈ cl (L)} be
the conclusion and set of premises, respectively of an application of (⇒∀)H and M a Herbrand
structure. We prove that M |= Γ ⇒ ∀xϕ,∆. By the induction hypothesis, M |= Γ ⇒ ϕ{ t
x
}
,∆
for every t ∈ cl (L). If M |= Γ ⇒ ∆, then we have that M |= Γ ⇒ ∀xϕ,∆. Otherwise, using
Lemma 2.2, we must have M |= ϕ{ t
x
}
for every t ∈ cl (L). In such a case, M |= ∀xϕ, and in
particular, M |= Γ⇒ ∀xϕ,∆.
2. For GSH= , the additional rules are proved to be sound similarly to the classical case.
3. For GH= , (⇒=) is proved to be sound similarly to the classical case. As for (=⇒), let s = t⇒ be
an application of (=⇒). Since s and t are distinct and M is a Herbrand structure, M 6|= s = t, and
so M |= s = t⇒.
We now turn to completeness. The main challenge in the completeness proofs is the unavailability
of Lindenbaum’s lemma, due to the infinitary nature of the systems. This, in turn, renders the standard
construction of a maximal unprovable sequent inapplicable. To solve this problem, we employ a similar
method to the one used in [20, 38], and generate a sequent that admits all the necessary properties for
inducing a countermodel, without necessarily being maximal-unprovable. This is achieved by the addition
of Henkin witnesses from L itself (unlike in the classical case, where the language is extended with new
constant symbols that serve as Henkin witnesses). We first describe the constructions for the system GH ,
and then consider their amendments for the GH= and GSH= .
Lemma 3.7.
1. If 6`GH Γ⇒ ∆ and ∀xϕ ∈ ∆, then there exists t ∈ cl (L) such that 6`GH Γ⇒ ϕ
{
t
x
}
,∆.
2. If 6`GH Γ⇒ ∆ and ∃xϕ ∈ Γ, then there exists t ∈ cl (L) such that 6`GH Γ, ϕ
{
t
x
}⇒ ∆.
Proof.
1. Assume otherwise. Then `GH Γ ⇒ ϕ
{
t
x
}
,∆ for every t ∈ cl (L). Using (⇒∀)H , `GH Γ ⇒ ∆
which is a contradiction.
2. Assume otherwise. Then `GH Γ, ϕ
{
t
x
} ⇒ ∆ for every t ∈ cl (L). Using (∃⇒)H , `GH Γ ⇒ ∆
which is a contradiction.
For the following constructions and properties, we assume some given sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ that is
unprovable, and an enumeration ψ0, ψ1, . . . of the closed formulas of L. We inductively define a sequence
s0 = Γ0 ⇒ ∆0, s1 = Γ1 ⇒ ∆1, . . . of sequents as follows.
s0 = Γ⇒ ∆
s2i+1 =
{
Γ2i, ψi ⇒ ∆2i if 6`GH Γ2i, ψi ⇒ ∆2i
Γ2i ⇒ ψi,∆2i otherwise
s2i+2 =

Γ2i+1 ⇒ ϕ
{
t
x
}
,∆2i+1 if ψi = ∀xϕ ∈ ∆2i+1
Γ2i+1, ϕ
{
t
x
}⇒ ∆2i+1 if ψi = ∃xϕ ∈ Γ2i+1
si+1 otherwise
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where t is taken to be the minimal closed term given by Lemma 3.7 w.r.t. a chosen well-ordering on cl(L).
This construction follows the usual construction of a maximal unprovable sequent, with the crucial change
that the so-called “Henkin-witnesses” (added to sequents with even indexes) consist of closed terms in the
language, and not new constant symbols.
This sequence contains each of the closed formulas of L.
Lemma 3.8. ψi ∈ Γ2i+1 ∪∆2i+1 for every i ∈ N.
Moreover, when the sequent Γ⇒ ∆ is unprovable, so are all the sequents in the sequence.
Lemma 3.9. 6`GH Γi ⇒ ∆i for every i ∈ N.
Proof. By induction on i. The base case follows from the assumption regarding Γ ⇒ ∆. Let i ≥ 0.
Assume that 6`GH s2i. We prove that 6`GH s2i+1 and 6`GH s2i+2. We start with 6`GH s2i+1. If
6`GH Γ2i, ψi ⇒ ∆2i, then 6`GH s2i+1. Otherwise, `GH Γ2i, ψi ⇒ ∆2i, and then using cut, we must
have that 6`GH s2i+1, as otherwise the induction hypothesis would be contradicted. Now for s2i+2. If
ψi = ∀xϕ ∈ ∆2i+1 then the fact that 6`GH si+2 follows from the choice of t according to Lemma 3.7,
using the fact that 6`GH s2i+1. If ψi = ∃xϕ ∈ Γ2i+1 then this is similar. Otherwise, si+2 = si+1, and we
have already shown that 6`GH si+1.
Let L =
⋃
i∈N Γi and R =
⋃
i∈N ∆i.
Lemma 3.10. {L,R} is a partition of the set of closed formulas.
Proof. By Lemma 3.8, for every formula ψi, ψi ∈ Γ2i+1 ∪∆2i+1 ⊆ L∪R. Now assume L∩R 6= ∅. Then
there are i, j ∈ N such that ψ ∈ Γi∩∆j . Let k = max {i, j}. Then ψ ∈ Γk∩∆k, contradicting Lemma 3.9.
Finally, neither L nor R can be empty, as L contains all tautologies and R all contradictions.
Given the sequence of sequents from Γ ⇒ ∆ defined above, we then define the following
Herbrand structure: M = 〈D, I〉, where D = cl (L), I (t) = t for every t ∈ cl (L), and
I (P ) = {〈t1, . . . , tn〉 ∈ Dn | P (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ L}. This structure has the following property.
Lemma 3.11. ϕ ∈ L iff M |= ϕ.
Proof. By induction on ϕ.
1. If ϕ ∈ catoms (L) then this follows by the definition of M .
2. If ϕ = ϕ1 ⊃ ϕ2 then:
(a) Suppose ϕ ∈ L, and assume for contradiction that M 6|= ϕ. Then M |= ϕ1 and M 6|= ϕ2. By
the induction hypothesis, ϕ1 ∈ L and ϕ2 /∈ L, that is, ϕ2 ∈ R. Thus there exists k ∈ N such
that ϕ1, ϕ ∈ Γk, while ϕ2 ∈ ∆k, contradicting Lemma 3.9 using (⊃⇒).
(b) Suppose ϕ /∈ L. Then ϕ ∈ R. Assume for contradiction that M |= ϕ. Then either M 6|= ϕ1
or M |= ϕ2. By the induction hypothesis, either ϕ1 /∈ L (that is, ϕ1 ∈ R) or ϕ2 ∈ L. Thus
there exists k ∈ N such that ϕ ∈ ∆k, and either ϕ2 ∈ Γk or ϕ1 ∈ ∆k. Either way, we obtain a
contradiction to Lemma 3.9 using (⇒⊃).
3. If ϕ has one of the forms ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2, ϕ1 ⊃ ϕ2 or ¬ψ then this is shown similarly.
4. If ϕ = ∀xψ then:
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(a) Suppose ϕ ∈ L, and assume for contradiction that M 6|= ϕ. Then M 6|= ψ { t
x
}
for some
t ∈ cl (L). By the induction hypothesis, ψ { t
x
}
/∈ L, that is, ψ { t
x
} ∈ R, which means that
there exists k ∈ N such that ϕ ∈ Γk and ψ
{
t
x
} ∈ ∆k, which contradicts Lemma 3.9 using
(∀⇒).
(b) Suppose ϕ /∈ L. Then ϕ ∈ R. Assume for contradiction that M |= ϕ. Then M |= ψ { t
x
}
for
every t ∈ cl (L). By the induction hypothesis, ψ { t
x
} ∈ L for every t ∈ cl (L). Let k ∈ N
such that ϕ = ψk. By Lemma 3.8, ϕ ∈ Γ2k+1 ∪ ∆2k+1. ϕ /∈ L and thus ϕ ∈ ∆2k+1. By
definition, there exists some t ∈ cl (L) such that ψ { t
x
} ∈ ∆2k+2. Thus there exists some
n ∈ N such that ψ { t
x
} ∈ Γn ∩∆n, which contradicts Lemma 3.9.
5. If ϕ = ∃xψ then this is shown similarly.
We now describe the necessary modifications in the above arguments for GSH= and GH= .
For GSH= , the definition of L and R, as well as the amended Lemmas 3.9 and 3.10, are analogues.
The definition of M , however, is changed as follows. Define a binary relation ∼ over cl (L) by: s ∼ t
iff s = t ∈ L. The fact that this is an equivalence relation can be shown using (⇒=), (PM1), (PM2),
and some inessential cuts (cuts on equations). We define a countermodel M = 〈D, I〉 by setting
D = cl (L) / ∼ (that is,D is the quotient set of cl (L) by∼), (I (f)) ([t1]∼ , . . . , [tn]∼) = [f (t1, . . . , tn)]∼
for every f ∈ func (L), and I (P ) is given by: {〈[t1]∼ , . . . , [tn]∼〉 ∈ Dn | P (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ L} for every
P ∈ pred (L). First, let us show that the definitions of I (f) and I (P ) do not depend on the chosen
representatives. If ti ∼ t′i for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, then ti = t′i ∈ L for every such i, and using (⇒=)
and repeated applications of (PM1) and (PM2), we obtain that f (t1, . . . , tn) = f (t′1, . . . , t
′
n) ∈ L, and
thus f (t1, . . . , tn) ∼ f (t′1, . . . , t′n). It is similarly shown that P (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ L iff P (t′1, . . . , t′n) ∈ L.
Also, we have that I (t) = [t]∼ for every t ∈ cl (L). This is shown by induction on t. If t is a constant
then this is immediate from the definition of I . If t = f (t1, . . . , tn), then we have by the induction
hypothesis that I (ti) = [ti]∼ for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since I does not depend on the representatives, we have
that I (f (t1, . . . , tn)) = (I (f)) ([t1]∼ , . . . , [tn]∼) = [f (t1, . . . , tn)]∼. For the amended Lemma 3.11, we
prove the two base cases, for equations and atomic formulas.
1. If ϕ is s = t then we have that ϕ ∈ L iff s ∼ t, iff I (s) = I (t), which holds iff M |= ϕ.
2. If ϕ = P (t1, . . . , tn) then we have that ϕ ∈ L iff 〈[t1]∼ , . . . , [tn]∼〉 ∈ I (P ) iff M |= P (t1, . . . , tn).
For GH= , we adjust M to be normal by setting I (=) to be {〈t, t〉 | t ∈ cl (L)}. In Lemma 3.11, a
second base case, in which ϕ is s = t, has to be considered:
1. If s = t ∈ L, then there exists some k ∈ N such that s = t ∈ Γk. Assume for contradiction
that M 6|= s = t. Then s and t are distinct terms, as M is a Herbrand structure. This contradicts
Lemma 3.9 using (=⇒).
2. If s = t /∈ L, then s = t ∈ R, and so there exists some k ∈ N such that s = t ∈ ∆k. Assume for
contradiction that M |= s = t. Then since it is a Herbrand structure, s and t are the same term.
Using (⇒=), we get a contradiction to Lemma 3.9.
We now prove the completeness results.
Theorem 3.12 (Completeness). Let s be a closed sequent. The following hold:
1. `GH s if `H s.
2. `GH= s if `H= s.
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3. `GSH= s if `SH= s.
Proof. We show the contrapositive. Assume s is not provable. Then, by (the appropriate variant of)
Lemma 3.11, for every ϕ ∈ Γ ⊆ L we have M |= ϕ, and for every ψ ∈ ∆ ⊆ R we have ψ /∈ L and so
M 6|= ϕ. Therefore, M 6|= s.
Note that Theorem 3.12 provides an alternative, less constructive proof of Proposition 3.4 (together
with Proposition 2.6 and the classical soundness theorem).
Due to Proposition 2.6, GH is also sound and complete for `SH .
3.2 Manipulating Finite Sequents
The proof systems introduced in this section are not effective, as they manipulate both infinite sequents
and infinite proof trees. Are these two sources of non-effectiveness tightly coupled? Consider, for example,
a finite sequent s. Although s is finite, it may still have infinite derivations, that involve applications of
(⇒∀)H with a finite context sequent Γ⇒ ∆. However, do we at least have that all sequents that occur in
its (possibly infinite) proof are finite? The answer is positive, as shown in the following proposition:
Proposition 3.13. Let s be a finite sequent and let G be one of the systems GH , GH= , or GSH= . If s is
provable in G, then s has a derivation in G that consists solely of finite sequents.
Proof. By induction on the height of the proof of s, using the fact that no rule in these systems concludes
a finite sequent if an infinite sequent exists in the assumptions.
4 Infinite-height Systems
In this section, we explore infinite-height (but finite-width) proof systems for Herbrand logics. The
soundness of such infinitary proof theories is underpinned by the principle of infinite descent [8, 9, 10,
16, 18, 35, 39]: proofs are permitted to be infinite, non-well-founded trees, but subject to the restriction
that every infinite path in the proof admits some infinite descent. In our case the descent is witnessed by
tracing terms descending via the subterm ordering, which is sound precisely because elements in Herbrand
structures are identified by some (finite) term. For this reason, the systems we describe below can be
considered systems of implicit induction, as opposed to those which employ explicit rules for applying
induction principles, like those presented in the previous section.
A basic feature of our infinite-height systems is that they replace the infinite width (⇒∀)H and (∃⇒)H
rules with ‘case-split’ rules. In contrast to the systems of Section 3, the infinite-height systems crucially
rely on the presence of free variables in sequents, in order to form traces from which to construct infinite
descent arguments. Moreover, in order to obtain systems of finite width we assume func(L) is finite. Note
that, as in Definition 3.1 above, the systems we consider in this section contain infinite sequents but that,
similarly to the infinite-width systems, proofs of finite sequents require finite sequents only.
Definition 4.1. The infinitary proof systems G∞H , G
∞
H=
and G∞SH= are obtained from GH , GH= and GSH= ,
respectively, by removing (⇒∀)H and (∃⇒)H , allowing open sequents, adding the following substitution
rule:
Γ⇒ ∆
Γ
{
t
x
}
⇒ ∆
{
t
x
} (subst)
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restoring the standard (⇒∀) and (∃⇒) rules of LK:
(⇒∀) Γ⇒ ϕ
{
y
x
}
,∆
Γ⇒ ∀xϕ,∆ (∃⇒)
Γ, ϕ
{
y
x
}
⇒ ∆
Γ,∃xϕ⇒ ∆
where in both rules y does not occur free in the lower sequent, and then adding the following case-split
rules, (case L) to G∞H , and (case L=) to both GH= and GSH=:{
Γ
{
f(x1,...,xn)
y
}
⇒ ∆
{
f(x1,...,xn)
y
}
: f ∈ func(L)
}
Γ
{
t
y
}
⇒ ∆
{
t
y
} (case L)
{Γ, t = f(x1, . . . , xn)⇒ ∆ : f ∈ func(L)}
Γ⇒ ∆ (case L=)
where in both rules, each variable xi is distinct and does not occur in t or any formula in Γ ∪∆.
Example 4.2. For LNAT, with nullary and unary function symbols 0 and s, respectively, the case split rules
are the following:
Γ
{
0
y
}
⇒ ∆
{
0
y
}
Γ
{
s(x)
y
}
⇒ ∆
{
s(x)
y
}
Γ
{
t
y
}
⇒ ∆
{
t
y
} (case LNAT)
Γ, t = 0⇒ ∆ Γ, t = s(x)⇒ ∆
Γ⇒ ∆
(case LNAT=)
where x is a fresh variable not occurring in the conclusion.
We allow derivations in this system to be non-well-founded (i.e. have infinite height). However, not all
such derivations yield valid conclusions, so we use the terminology ‘pre-proof’.
Definition 4.3 (Pre-proofs). A pre-proof is a possibly infinite (i.e. non-well-founded) derivation tree formed
using the inference rules. A path in a pre-proof is a possibly infinite sequence of sequents s0, s1, . . . (, sn)
such that s0 is the root sequent of the proof, and si+1 is a premise of si for each i < n.
To distinguish the pre-proofs that derive valid conclusions from those that don’t, we use the following
notion of a trace of terms through a pre-proof.
Definition 4.4 (Trace Pairs). Let t and t′ be terms occurring (possibly as subterms) in the conclusion s and
a premise s′, respectively, of (an instance of) an inference rule; then (t, t′) is said to be a trace pair for
(s, s′) when the following conditions hold:
• t and t′ only contain free variables (i.e. they do not contain variables that are bound by any quantifiers
under whose scope they occur);
• if the rule is an instance of the substitution rule, then t is the result of applying the substitution of
the instance to t′;
• if the rule is an instance of any other rule and t and t′ are not identical, then either:
– the rule is an instance of (case L=), with t the left-hand term and t′ one of the variables xi in
the equality formula eliminated from the premise; or
– the rule is an instance of (case L), with t the term substituted in the conclusion and t′ one of
the variables xi in the term f(x1, . . . , xn) substituted in the premise.
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In both these cases, we say that (t, t′) is progressing.
We use trace pairs to construct traces along paths in a pre-proof.
Definition 4.5 (Traces). A trace is a (possibly infinite) sequence of terms. We say that a trace t1, t2, . . . (, tn)
follows a path s1, s2, . . . (, sm) in a pre-proof if, for some k ≥ 0, each consecutive pair of terms (ti, ti+1)
is a trace pair for (si+k, si+k+1). If (ti, ti+1) is progressing then we say that the trace progresses at i, and
we say that the trace is infinitely progressing if it progresses at infinitely many points.
Proofs, then, are pre-proofs which satisfy a global trace condition.
Definition 4.6 (Infinite Proofs). A proof is a pre-proof in which every infinite path is followed by some
infinitely progressing trace.
The soundness of the non-well-founded systems is a consequence of a strong form of local soundness
of the inference rules. This strength relates to the fact that we can endow the domains of the underlying
(semi-)Herbrand structures with a well-ordering as follows. First, we take some well-founded path ordering
on the set of (closed) terms, e.g. the lexicographic path ordering induced by some total ordering on the
function symbols of the signature [19]. A crucial point is that this includes the subterm relation. Now,
since every element of a semi-Herbrand structure has some representation as a closed term we can then lift
this ordering to the domain of the structure by taking the smallest term representation corresponding to
each element. That is, for a semi-Herbrand structure 〈D, I〉, d ∈ D is smaller than d′ ∈ D iff the smallest
closed term t such that d = I(t) is smaller than the smallest closed term u such that d′ = I(u). Let us
denote this ordering as @ and its non-strict counterpart as v.
Lemma 4.7 (Trace Pair Local Soundness). Let G be one of the systems G∞H , G∞H= , or G∞SH= , M = 〈D, I〉 a
(semi-)Herbrand structure appropriate for G, and σ a substitution such that M 6|= sσ for the conclusion s
of an instance of an inference rule in G; then there is a substitution σ′ such thatM 6|= siσ′ for some premise
si of the rule and, moreover, for all trace pairs (t, ti) for (s, si), I(tiσ
′
) v I(tσ) and I(tiσ′) @ I(tσ) when
(t, t′) is progressing.
Proof. The cases for the standard logical inference rules, (PM1), (PM2), (⇒=), and (=⇒) are straight-
forward. We give the proof for the case-split rules.
(case L=): Suppose M 6|= (Γ ⇒ ∆)σ; that is, M |= ϕσ for every ϕ ∈ Γ but M 6|= ψσ for
each ψ ∈ ∆. Now, I(tσ) has some term representation and, in particular, it has a small-
est one w.r.t. @. That is I(tσ) = I(f(t1, . . . , tn)) for some f ∈ func(L) and closed terms
t1, . . . , tn with I(f(t1, . . . , tn)) v I(u) for all closed terms u such that I(tσ) = I(u). So
let σ′ = σ[x1 7→ t1, . . . , xn 7→ tn]. Then, since each xi does not occur in t, we have
I(tσ
′
) = I(tσ) = I(f(t1, . . . , tn)) = I(f(x1
σ′ , . . . , xn
σ′)) = I(f(x1, . . . , xn)
σ′). That is,
M |= (t = f(x1, . . . , xn))σ′ . Moreover, since each xi does not occur in Γ or ∆, we have that
I(ϕσ
′
) = I(ϕσ) for each ϕ ∈ Γ ∪ ∆. Therefore, M |= ϕσ′ for each ϕ ∈ Γ and M 6|= ψσ′ for
each ψ ∈ ∆. Hence M 6|= (Γ, t = f(x1, . . . , xn)⇒ ∆)σ′ . Now, each (t, xi) is a progressing trace
pair, so we must show that I(xiσ
′
) @ I(tσ). Notice that I(xiσ
′
) = I(ti) and so, by definition, the
smallest closed term u such that I(xiσ
′
) = I(u) satisfies u v ti. Furthermore, ti @ f(t1, . . . , tn),
by the subterm ordering. Therefore u @ f(t1, . . . , tn) and since the latter term is the smallest closed
representation of I(tσ) we have that I(xiσ
′
) @ I(tσ), as required. Finally, I(tσ) = I(uσ′) for every
other trace pair (t, u) since each xi does not occur in t or u, thus trivially I(tσ) v I(uσ′).
(case L): This case is similar to the above, except that we reason that M |= ϕ{f(x1,...,xn)
y
}σ′ for each ϕ ∈ Γ
and M 6|= ψ{f(x1,...,xn)
y
}σ′ from the assumption that M |= ϕ{ t
y
}σ for each ϕ ∈ Γ and M 6|= ψ{ t
y
}σ.
This of course follows from that fact that I(tσ) = I(f(x1, . . . , xn)
σ′) as shown above.
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Given a non-well-founded proof (i.e. a pre-proof satisfying the global trace condition), this property
allows us to construct an infinite descent-style argument that the conclusion is valid.
Theorem 4.8 (Soundness). Let s be a sequent. The following hold:
1. `G∞H s only if `H s.
2. `G∞H= s only if `H= s.
3. `G∞SH= s only if `SH= s.
Proof. The structure of the proof is the same in each case. Suppose we have a proof of s and suppose, for
contradiction, that s is not valid (w.r.t. the appropriate class of structures). Thus, by Lemma 2.4, there is a
structure M = 〈D, I〉 (of the appropriate class) and substitution σ (cf. Definition 3.3) such that M 6|= sσ.
By Lemma 4.7, we can then construct an infinite path s1, s2, . . . through the proof along with an infinite
sequence of substitutions σ1, σ2, . . . such that M 6|= siσi for each i > 0. Since we have a proof, there is an
infinitely progressing trace t1, t2, . . . following this path; that is, there is some k ≥ 0 such that (ti, ti+1)
is a trace pair for (si+k, si+k+1) for each i > 0. Thus, again from Lemma 4.7, it follows that we have a
descending chain I(t1σk+1) w I(t2σk+1) w . . . which, moreover, is infinitely descending since the trace is
infinitely progressing. However, we have that @ is well-founded, and thus we have derived a contradiction.
We therefore conclude that Γ⇒ ∆ is valid (w.r.t. the appropriate class of structures) after all.
Moreover, we can show for closed sequents that the non-well-founded proof systems are complete for
the Herbrand semantics. This is due to the fact that we can simulate the (⇒∀)H and (∃⇒)H rules in the
infinite height systems as the limit of an iteratively constructed sequence of open derivations.
Definition 4.9 (Simulation of (⇒∀)H and (∃⇒)H). Take an instance of (⇒∀)H or (∃⇒)H with conclusion
Γ⇒ ∀xϕ,∆ or Γ,∃xϕ⇒ ∆, respectively. Notice we may assume w.l.o.g. that x does not appear free in
Γ or ∆. Fix an enumeration x, x1, x2, . . . of the variables not occurring free in the conclusion, starting
with x, and let < denote the corresponding induced ordering on variables. Let the function symbols of L
be f1, . . . , fn, of arities k1, . . . , kn, respectively. We define infinite sequences D0, D1, . . . and D′0, D
′
1, . . .
of open derivations inductively. We start with an application of the (⇒∀) or (∃⇒) rule.
D0 =
Γ⇒ ϕ,∆
(⇒∀)
Γ⇒ ∀xϕ,∆ D
′
0 =
Γ, ϕ⇒ ∆
(∃⇒)
Γ,∃xϕ⇒ ∆
The derivations Di+1 and D′i+1 are defined by applying inference rules to the open leaves of the derivations
Di and D′i, respectively. The construction maintains the invariant that the sequents of the open leaves of
each derivation Di+1 and D′i+1 are of the form Γ⇒ ψ,∆ and Γ, ψ ⇒ ∆, respectively, with the formula ψ
being ϕ
{
t
x
}
for some (possibly open) term t. The derivation Di+1 is defined by applying the following
inference rules to each open leaf Γ⇒ ψ,∆ in Di containing free variables ≤-related to x, where xj and
xq denote, respectively, the <-smallest and <-largest free variables in ψ.
Γ⇒ ψ
{
f1(xq+1,...,xq+k1 )
xj
}
,∆
(PM2)
Γ, xj = f1(xq+1, . . . , xq+k1)⇒ ψ,∆ . . .
Γ⇒ ψ
{
fn(xq+1,...,xq+kn )
xj
}
,∆
(PM2)
Γ, xj = fn(xq+1, . . . , xq+kn)⇒ ψ,∆
(case L=)
Γ⇒ ψ(xj, . . . , xq),∆·····
Di
Γ⇒ ∀xϕ∆
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Similarly, each D′i+1 is obtained from D
′
i be applying the following inference rules to each open leaf.
Γ, ψ
{
f1(xq+1,...,xq+k1 )
xj
}
⇒ ∆
(‡f1 )
Γ, xj = f1(xq+1, . . . , xq+k1), ψ ⇒ ∆ . . .
Γ, ψ
{
fn(xq+1,...,xq+kn )
xj
}
⇒ ∆
(‡fn )
Γ, xj = fn(xq+1, . . . , xq+kn), ψ ⇒ ∆
(case L=)
Γ, ψ(xj, . . . , xq)⇒ ∆·····
D′i
Γ,∃xϕ⇒ ∆
The inferences marked (‡fi) abbreviate the following schema.
(axiom)
ψ ⇒ ψ
{
xj
xj
}
(PM1)
xj = fi(xq+1, . . . , xq+ki), ψ ⇒ ψ
{
fi(xq+1,...,xq+ki )
xj
}
Γ, ψ
{
fi(xq+1,...,xq+ki )
xj
}
⇒ ∆
(cut)
Γ, xj = fi(xq+1, . . . , xq+ki), ψ ⇒ ∆
Thus each derivationDi (resp.D′i) is a prefix ofDi+1 (resp.D
′
i+1). The limits of the sequencesD0, D1, . . .
and D′0, D
′
1, . . . are the smallest derivations D∞ and D
′
∞ such that each Di and D
′
i are prefixes of D∞
and D′∞, respectively, for every i ≥ 0. The derivations D∞ and D′∞ simulate, in both G∞H= and G∞SH= ,
the (⇒∀)H and (∃⇒)H rules, respectively. To simulate the rules in G∞H , we adapt this construction by
using the (case L) rule instead of (case L=) and eliding the paramodulation steps, the effects of which are
instead carried out directly by the substitutions in the (case L) rule.
Example 4.10. Figures 3a and 3b show the derivations simulating the (⇒∀)H and (∃⇒)H rules for the
language LNAT, with nullary and unary function symbols 0 and s, respectively.
Theorem 4.11 (Completeness). Let s be a closed sequent. The following hold:
1. `G∞H s if `H s.
2. `G∞H= s if `H= s.
3. `G∞SH= s if `SH= s.
Proof. By completeness of the infinite-width proof systems (Theorem 3.12), it suffices to show that the
(⇒∀)H and (∃⇒)H rules are derivable in each of the infinite-height proof systems, and that any pre-
proof corresponding to an infinite-width proof via these derived rules satisfies the global trace condition.
Derivability of the (⇒∀)H and (∃⇒)H rules in the infinite-height systems is shown in Definition 4.9. We
now show that any pre-proofs using these derived rules satisfy the global trace condition. For languages
with at least one constant the simulations of these rules have a possibly infinite (and non-zero) number
of branches, but each path from the conclusion to an open leaf is of finite (although unbounded) height.
Thus pre-proofs simulating GH= and GSH= proofs using these derivation schemes will not contain any
infinite paths, and so trivially satisfy the global trace condition. Languages without constants actually
have no closed terms, and thus the (⇒∀)H and (∃⇒)H rules are 0-premise rules. For these languages, the
derivation schemes described in Definition 4.9 will also not contain any open leaves, but instead admit an
infinite number of infinite paths. Notice, however, that along each of these infinite paths we can construct
a trace following the variables x, x1, x2, . . . that progresses at each case-split rule, of which there are
infinitely many.
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Γ⇒ ϕ
{
0
x
}
,∆
(PM2)
Γ, x = 0⇒ ϕ(x),∆
Γ⇒ ϕ
{
s(0)
x
}
,∆
(PM2)
Γ, x1 = 0⇒ ϕ
{
s(x1)
x
}
,∆
Γ⇒ ϕ
{
s(s(0))
x
}
,∆ . . . Γ⇒ ϕ
{
sn(0)
x
}
,∆ . . .
···
Γ⇒ ϕ
{
s(s(x2))
x
}
,∆
(PM2)
Γ, x1 = s(x2)⇒ ϕ
{
s(x1)
x
}
,∆
(case LNAT=)
Γ⇒ ϕ
{
s(x1)
x
}
,∆
(PM2)
Γ, x = s(x1)⇒ ϕ(x),∆
(case LNAT=)
Γ⇒ ϕ(x),∆
(⇒∀)
Γ⇒ ∀xϕ,∆
(a) Simulation of the (⇒∀)H rule.
Γ, ϕ
{
0
x
}
⇒ ∆
(‡0)
Γ, x = 0, ϕ(x)⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ
{
s(0)
x
}
⇒ ∆
(‡0)
Γ, x1 = 0, ϕ
{
s(x1)
x
}
⇒ ∆
Γ, ϕ
{
s(s(0))
x
}
⇒ ∆ . . . Γ, ϕ
{
sn(0)
x
}
⇒ ∆ . . .
···
Γ, ϕ
{
s(s(x2))
x
}
⇒ ∆
(‡s)
Γ, x1 = s(x2), ϕ
{
s(x1)
x
}
⇒ ∆
(case LNAT=)
Γ, ϕ
{
s(x1)
x
}
⇒ ∆
(‡s)
Γ, x = s(x1), ϕ(x)⇒ ∆
(case LNAT=)
Γ, ϕ(x)⇒ ∆
(∃⇒)
Γ,∃xϕ⇒ ∆
(b) Simulation of the (∃⇒)H rule.
Figure 3: Simulations of the infinite width rules in G∞H=/G
∞
SH=
for the language LNAT.
Lastly, a counterpart of Proposition 3.13 can be obtained for the proof systems of this section.
Proposition 4.12. Let s be a finite sequent and let G be one of the systems G∞H , G∞H= , or G∞SH= . If s is
provable in G, then s has a derivation in G that consists solely of finite sequents.
Proof. By Theorem 4.8 and Proposition 3.13, there is an infinite-width proof using only finite sequents.
The constructions of Definition 4.9 that simulate the infinite width rules do not introduce infinite sequents
if the root sequent is finite. Therefore, we can construct an infinite-height proof containing only finite
sequents.
The purpose of studying the infinitary systems in the previous two sections, in particular the com-
pleteness results, is two-fold. Firstly, it provides a solid foundation for the effective approximations
that we present in the next section: the induction-based system of Section 5.1, which approximates the
infinite-width system, and the cyclic system of Section 5.2, which approximates the infinite-height system.
We would like our approximations to capture as much as possible; there is therefore little point in starting
with an already incomplete system. Secondly, it provides a context for the comparison of the effective
systems. In Section 5.3 we show that, for some languages, the cyclic approximation is more expressive
than the induction-based approximation. One might suppose that this is due to some intrinsic difference in
expressiveness between infinite width and infinite height. Our soundness and completeness results show
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Figure 4: Effective Derivation Rules for Herbrand and semi-Herbrand Logics
(⇒∀)IND
{
Γ, ϕ
{
x1
x
}
, . . . , ϕ
{
xn
x
}⇒ ϕ{f(x1,...,xn)
x
}
,∆ : f ∈ func (L)
}
Γ⇒ ∀xϕ,∆
(∃⇒)IND
{
Γ, ϕ
{
f(x1,...,xn)
x
}
⇒ ϕ{x1
x
}
, . . . , ϕ
{
xn
x
}
,∆ : f ∈ func (L)
}
Γ,∃xϕ⇒ ∆
In (⇒ ∀)IND and (∃ ⇒)IND, x1, . . . , xn do not occur free in Γ ∪∆.
(⇒=)IND
Γ⇒ x = x,∆
(=⇒)1
Γ, f (x1, . . . , xn) = g (y1, . . . , ym)⇒ ∆ f 6= g ∈ func (L)
(=⇒)2 Γ, xi = yi ⇒ ∆
Γ, f (x1 . . . , xi, . . . , xn) = f (x1, . . . , yi, . . . , xn)⇒ ∆ f ∈ func
+ (L)
that this is not the case: both infinitary systems capture the full expressivity of Herbrand logics. Thus we
can pin-point the difference in expressiveness between the approximations as lying in the nature of the
respective gaps between effectiveness and non-effectiveness in each case.
5 Effective Approximations
While the proof systems presented in Sections 3 and 4 are sound and complete with respect to Herbrand
logics, they are not effective, in the sense that proofs cannot be verified. What is more, the set of proofs
cannot even be enumerated. Thus, for systems that are more suitable for automated reasoning, one needs
to sacrifice completeness for the sake of effectiveness. Accordingly, in this section, we provide finitary
counterparts of the infinitary systems presented in Sections 3 and 4.
5.1 Induction-Based Systems
The finitary inductive systems that we introduce in this section can be seen as natural restrictions of the
infinite-width systems of Section 3 above. However to recover some of the strength of those systems, they
must incorporate free variables in sequents. Accordingly, let GIND be the sequent calculus obtained from
G (cf. Page 7) by allowing only finite sequents in applications of rules, and permitting open sequents. To
obtain finitary systems, in this section we assume func (L) is finite.
Definition 5.1. Figure 4 includes the additional derivation rules employed.
1. GINDH = G
IND + (⇒∀)IND + (∃⇒)IND + (subst).
2. GINDSH= = G
IND
H + (⇒=)IND + (PM1) + (PM2).
3. GINDH= = G
IND
SH=
+ (=⇒)1 + (=⇒)2
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The key idea in constructing the above systems is to replace the infinitary rules (⇒∀)H and (∃⇒)H by
finitary approximations. This is achieved by taking PA’s induction scheme as a finite approximation of
the ω-rule. Accordingly, we replace (⇒∀)H , which is a language-based version of the ω-rule, with a new
rule, (⇒∀)IND , which is a language-based version of Gentzen’s induction rule for PA. (∃⇒)IND is treated
symmetrically.
Following Example 2.12, we note that for LNAT, applications of (⇒∀)IND have the form
Γ⇒ ϕ{ 0
x
}
,∆ Γ, ϕ
{
x1
x
}⇒ ϕ{ s(x1)
x
}
,∆
Γ⇒ ∀xϕ,∆ (1)
Actually, Gentzen’s original induction scheme for PA is easily derivable in the above systems, using (1)
and (∀⇒). What enables the effective formulation of PA’s induction rule is the fact that the language of
PA is finite. The above systems can manipulate languages which are more expressive than that of PA,
since they allow multiple constant symbols, as well as function symbols with arbitrary arities. However,
we still assume that there are finitely many basic constructs for terms. This explains the requirement
employed in this section that func (L) is finite. The fact that func (L) is finite entails that GINDH , GINDSH=
and GINDH= are finitary, in the sense that their proof trees are always finite.
In search of effectiveness, we replace (=⇒) in the system for Herbrand logics with equality by two
rules (=⇒)1 and (=⇒)2, that correspond to sequent rules for disequalities in [36]. Those achieve precisely
the same power, while being actual finite sets of rules, rather than schemes. In order to be able to derive in
GINDH= all instances of the rule (=⇒) of GH= we include (PM1) and (PM2) in GINDH= (unlike in the original
system GH=).
Lemma 5.2. If t1 and t2 are two distinct closed terms of L, then `GINDH= t1 = t2 ⇒.
Proof. This is shown using induction on the sums of complexities of t1 and t2. The only interesting case
is when t1 = f (s1, . . . , sn) and t2 = f (r1, . . . , rn) for some n-ary function symbol f . Since t1 and t2 are
distinct, we must have some 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that si 6= ri. By the induction hypothesis, `GINDH= si = ri ⇒.
It is easy to verify that the sequent x = si, y = ri, xi = yi ⇒ si = ri is derivable in GH= . This, in turn,
enables the proof of t1 = t2 ⇒ in GINDH= , using cuts on the conclusion of the following derivation:
xi = si, yi = ri, xi = yi ⇒ si = ri
xi = si, yi = ri, f (x1, . . . , xi, . . . xn) = f (x1, . . . , yi, . . . , xn)⇒ si = ri (=⇒)2
si = si, ri = ri, f (x1, . . . , si, . . . , xn) = f (x1, . . . , ri, . . . , xn)⇒ si = ri (subst)
All the effective systems are complete for classical logic (as the rules (⇒∀) and (∃⇒) of LK are
derivable in them). They are, however, not sound for it (since they include consecutions that are only valid
in Herbrand logics). As a consequence of the finitary nature of the systems, one cannot expect that they
are complete with respect to Herbrand logics. For example, in the case of the language of the natural
numbers we obtain exactly the difference between the provable theorems of PA and the true statements
of arithmetics. Notwithstanding, the effective systems are both sound and expressive enough to capture
meaningful Herbrand-valid statements.
Theorem 5.3 (Soundness). Let s be a sequent. The following hold:
1. `GINDH s only if `H s.
2. `GINDSH= s only if `
SH= s.
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3. `GINDH= s only if `
H= s.
Proof. We extend Definition 3.5 by setting M |= s iff M satisfies every L-instance of s. For GINDH , the
only non-trivial cases are (⇒∀)IND and (∃⇒)IND . We here provide the proof for the first, as the second is
symmetrical.
Let M be a Herbrand model of the premises of (⇒∀)IND . We prove M |= Γ ⇒ ∀xϕ,∆. If
M |= Γ ⇒ ∆, this clearly holds. Otherwise, M |= ϕ
{
x1
x
}
, . . . , ϕ
{
xn
x
}
⇒ ϕ
{
f(x1,...,xn)
x
}
for every
f ∈ func (L). Thus, M satisfies every L-instance of such sequents. To show that M |= ∀xϕ, we consider
an arbitrary L-instance ∀xϕ′ of ∀xϕ, and prove that M |= ϕ′ { t
x
}
for every t ∈ cl (L), by inner induction
on t. If t ∈ consts (L), then this follows from the induction hypothesis (in this case, n = 0 and hence
the premise has the form Γ ⇒ ϕ{ t
x
}
,∆). Otherwise, t = f (t1, . . . , tn) for some f ∈ func+ (L) and
t1, . . . , tn ∈ cl (L) such that t1, . . . , tn all have lower complexities than t. By the induction hypothesis,
M |= ϕ′ { ti
x
}
for every 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since M |= ϕ′
{
x1
x
}
, . . . , ϕ′
{
xn
x
}
⇒ ϕ′
{
f(x1,...,xn)
x
}
, we also have
that M |= ϕ′ { t
x
}
.
Soundness for GINDSH= is obtained similarly, with the addition of the same arguments for equality as in
the classical case. For GINDH= , the fact that only Herbrand structures are considered is used to show the
validity of the rules (=⇒)1 and (=⇒)2.
Example 5.4. Following Example 2.12, consider GH= in the language LNAT. This system is also sound
w.r.t. the LNAT version of PA (with multiplication and addition as predicates). This can be shown by
induction on derivations in GH= , where the main case is the straightforward simulation of the induction
rule of PA with (⇒∀)IND .
Generalizing Example 5.4, consider the following generalized induction scheme for languages L with
finitely many function symbols, where each variable xi is distinct and fresh for ϕ: ∧
c∈consts(L)
ϕ
{ c
x
} ∧ ∧
f∈func+(L)
∀x1 . . . ∀xar(f)
 ∧
1≤i≤ar(f)
ϕ
{xi
x
} ⊃ ϕ{f(x1, . . . , xn)
x
} ⊃ ∀xϕ (INDL)
Lemma 5.5. The following hold:
1. GINDH is sound w.r.t. first-order structures for L that satisfy (INDL).
2. GINDSH= is sound w.r.t. normal first-order structures for L that satisfy (INDL).
3. GINDH= is sound w.r.t. normal first-order structures 〈D, I〉 for L that satisfy (INDL) and, furthermore,
in which: (a) the images of I(f) and I(g) in D are disjoint for each pair of distinct function symbols
f, g ∈ func(L); and (b) the interpretation I(f) of each function symbol f ∈ func(L) is injective.
5.2 Cyclic Systems
The infinite-height proof systems presented in Section 4 can also be restricted to retrieve effectiveness
by considering a subset of finitely representable proofs, namely the regular infinite proofs. These are
(possibly) infinite derivations that have only a finite number of distinct subtrees. They can be represented
by finite, possibly cyclic, graphs.
Definition 5.6 (Cyclic Pre-Proofs). A cyclic pre-proof is a pair (P, f) consisting of:
• a finite derivation tree P possibly containing open leaves (i.e. which are not conclusions of an axiom
schema) called buds; and
20
(†) Γ⇒ ϕ(x),∆
. .
. .
. .
. .
.
(subst)
Γ⇒ ϕ
{
x1
x
}
,∆
(†) Γ⇒ ϕ(x),∆
(subst)
Γ⇒ ϕ
{
xn
x
}
,∆ Γ, ϕ
{
x1
x
}
, . . . , ϕ
{
x1
xn
}
⇒ ϕ
{
f(x1,...,xn)
x
}
,∆
(cut)
Γ, ϕ
{
x1
x
}
, . . . , ϕ
{xn−1
x
}
⇒ ϕ
{
f(x1,...,xn)
x
}
,∆
···
Γ, ϕ
{
x1
x
}
⇒ ϕ
{
f(x1,...,xn)
x
}
,∆
(cut)
Γ⇒ ϕ
{
f(x1,...,xn)
x
}
,∆
(PM2)
Γ, x = f(x1, . . . , xn)⇒ ϕ(x),∆ : f ∈ func(L)
(case L=)
(†) Γ⇒ ϕ(x),∆
(⇒∀)
Γ⇒ ∀xϕ(x),∆
Figure 5: A derivation of the (⇒∀)IND rule in GωH=/GωSH= .
• a function f assigning to each bud an internal node of the tree, called its companion, with a
syntactically identical sequent.
The graph associated with a pre-proof is the one induced by identifying each bud with its companion.
For effectiveness, we here again consider only finite sequents.
Definition 5.7. The cyclic subsystems GωH , G
ω
H=
, and GωSH= are obtained by restricting to only the regular
pre-proofs of G∞H , G
∞
H=
and G∞SH= , respectively, containing finite sequents and satisfying the global trace
condition.
For cyclic pre-proofs the global trace condition, being an ω-regular property, is decidable. Since they
are a special case of the non-well-founded proofs, they are also sound for Herbrand semantics.
Corollary 5.8 (Soundness). The cyclic systems GωH , GωH= and G
ω
SH=
are sound with respect to their
corresponding Herbrand semantics.
5.3 Comparison Between the Approximations
This section establishes the connections between the two approaches described above. As in other systems
for inductive reasoning, we show that the cyclic systems are strictly stronger than the induction-based
ones. We start by showing that the cyclic proof systems subsume the explicit induction systems containing
rules (⇒∀)IND and (∃⇒)IND . This is a result of the following lemma.
Lemma 5.9. The rules (⇒∀)IND and (∃⇒)IND are derivable in each of GωH , GωH= and GωSH= .
Proof. The derivations in Figs. 5 and 6 simulate rules (⇒∀)IND and (∃⇒)IND in each of the cyclic
systems. In these derivations we assume (w.l.o.g.) that x does not occur free in Γ ∪∆. We show a generic
subderivation for the case x = f(x1, . . . , xn) of f ∈ func(L). Note that in the case f ∈ consts(L), for
the simulation of (⇒∀)IND the premise of the (PM2) rule is already the corresponding premise of the
(⇒∀)IND rule and so the remainder of the subderivation is not required. Similarly, in the simulation of
(∃⇒)IND instead of the subderivation concluding with (Cut), we may simply use the following:
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(id)
ϕ(x)⇒ ϕ(x)
(PM1)
ϕ(x), x = f(x1, . . . , xn)⇒ ϕ
{
f(x1,...,xn)
x
}
..
..
..
..
Γ, ϕ
{
f(x1,...,xn)
x
}
⇒ ϕ
{
x1
x
}
, . . . , ϕ
{
xn
x
}
,∆
··· (⇒∨)× n
Γ, ϕ
{
f(x1,...,xn)
x
}
⇒ ϕ
{
x1
x
}
∨ . . . ∨ ϕ
{
xn
x
}
,∆
(cut)
Γ, ϕ(x), x = f(x1, . . . , xn)⇒ ϕ
{
x1
x
}
∨ . . . ∨ ϕ
{
xn
x
}
,∆
(†) Γ, ϕ(x)⇒ ∆ .
. . .
. . .
. . .
(subst)
Γ, ϕ
{
x1
x
}
⇒ ∆
(†) Γ, ϕ(x)⇒ ∆
(subst)
Γ, ϕ
{
xn
x
}
⇒ ∆
···
Γ, ϕ
{
x2
x
}
∨ . . . ∨ ϕ
{
xn
x
}
⇒ ∆
(∨⇒)
Γ, ϕ
{
x1
x
}
∨ . . . ∨ ϕ
{
xn
x
}
⇒ ∆
(cut)
Γ, ϕ(x), x = f(x1, . . . , xn)⇒ ∆ : f ∈ func(L)
(case L=)
(†) Γ, ϕ(x)⇒ ∆
(⇒∃)
Γ,∃xϕ(x)⇒ ∆
Figure 6: A derivation of the (∃⇒)IND rule in GωH=/GωSH= .
(id)
ϕ(x)⇒ ϕ(x)
(PM1)
ϕ(x), x = f(x1, . . . , xn)⇒ ϕ
{
f(x1,...,xn)
x
}
Γ, ϕ
{
f(x1,...,xn)
x
}
⇒ ∆
(cut)
Γ, ϕ(x), x = f(x1, . . . , xn)⇒ ∆
In the case that f ∈ func+(L), the subderivation will have a non-zero number of buds, corresponding to
each subterm xi and marked by (†) in Figs. 5 and 6, which all link back to the conclusion of the (case L=)
instance.
As in the proof of Theorem 4.11, we can adapt the derivation schemes in Figs. 5 and 6 for the system
GωH without equality by simply eliding the paramodulation rules, whose effect is achieved via substitutions
in the (case L) rule.
Theorem 5.10. The following inclusions hold:
1. GINDH ⊆ GωH .
2. GINDH= ⊆ GωH= .
3. GINDSH= ⊆ GωSH= .
Proof. Consider the cyclic pre-proof obtained from an explicit induction proof by replacing each instance
of (⇒∀)IND and (∃⇒)IND by the derivations given in Lemma 5.9. Any infinite path in this proof must
eventually remain in a strongly connected component. However, notice that each such strongly connected
component is contained in an instance of these derived rules. It is easy to see that we can construct a trace
following this path. Notice that we can split the tail of this path into an infinite sequence of segments, each
corresponding to a path from the companion (†) up to one of the buds. Along the segment we construct a
trace as follows: start with x in the conclusion of the (case L) or (case L=) rule; in the premise of the rule
we then choose the xi corresponding to the branch taken by the segment, which is a progressing trace pair;
we may then trace xi all the way to the bud, which then becomes x again via the substitution rule. Each
segment contains a progression point, thus the trace is infinitely progressing.
Next, we show that there are languages for which the converse inclusion does not hold. For this we
can adapt the ‘Hydra’ counter-example given in [5] to establish the corresponding result for the explicit
and cyclic systems for first-order logic with inductive definitions. Note that we do not here derive any
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..
.
.
.
.
.
.
(id)
H ⇒ P (0, 0)
(id)
H ⇒ P (s(0), 0)
(†) H ⇒ P (x, y)
(subst)
H ⇒ P (s(x′′), x′′)
(H6)
H ⇒ P (s(s(x′′)), 0)
(case L)
H ⇒ P (s(x′), 0)
(case L)
H ⇒ P (x, 0)
(id)
H,P (x, s(0))⇒ P (x, s(0))
(∀⇒)
H ⇒ P (x, s(0))
(†) H ⇒ P (x, y)
(subst)
H ⇒ P (s(y′′), y′′)
(H5)
H ⇒ P (0, s(s(y′′)))
(†) H ⇒ P (x, y)
(subst)
H ⇒ P (x′, y′′)
(H4)
H ⇒ P (s(x′), s(s(y′′)))
(case L)
H ⇒ P (x, s(s(y′′)))
(case L)
H ⇒ P (x, s(y′))
(case L)
(†) H ⇒ P (x, y)
(∧⇒), (⇒∀)
H1 ∧ . . . ∧H6 ⇒ ∀x∀yP (x, y)
(⇒⊃)
⇒ (H1 ∧ . . . ∧H6) ⊃ ∀x∀yP (x, y)
Figure 7: A GωH proof of (2-Hydra).
essentially new results: we simply demonstrate that the constructions and results of [5] apply in the
Herbrand setting.
Consider a language that consists of a constant symbol 0, a unary function s, and a binary predicate P .
The Hydra statement is formalized as follows:
P (0, 0) ∧ P (s(0), 0) ∧ ∀xP (x, s(0))
∧ ∀x∀y(P (x, y) ⊃ P (s(x), s(s(y))))
∧ ∀x∀y(P (s(y), y) ⊃ P (0, s(s(y))))
∧ ∀x∀y(P (s(x), x) ⊃ P (s(s(y)), 0))
 ⊃ ∀x∀yP (x, y) (2-Hydra)
The antecedent of this implication characterises how the predicate P must be interpreted. It is
essentially an inductive definition. We denote by H the sequence H1, . . . , H6 of the conjuncts of the
antecedent. Note that in [5], to reason over the domain an inductive unary predicate N was used, thus
requiring quantifications in the Hydra statement to be bounded over N . However, since induction over the
domain is a built-in feature in the Herbrand setting we do not need to bound the quantifications here.
Lemma 5.11. (2-Hydra) is provable in the cyclic systems GωH , GωH= , and G
ω
SH=
.
Proof. Figure 7 shows a cyclic proof of (2-Hydra) in GωH , adapted from [5]. The buds, labelled with (†),
all have the same companion, which is the internal node of the proof labelled (†). The rule applications
labelled H4, H5, H6 abbreviate applications of (cut) that ‘unfold’ the right-hand side of the sequent
according to the named component of H . For example, the derivation abbreviated by H4 is the following:
H ⇒ P (x′, y′′)
(id)
H,P (x′, y′′), P (s(x′), s(s(y′′)))⇒ P (s(x′), s(s(y′′)))
(id)
H,P (x′, y′′)⇒ P (x′, y′′), P (s(x′), s(s(y′′)))
(⊃⇒)
H,P (x′, y′′), P (x′, y′′) ⊃ P (s(x′), s(s(y′′)))⇒ P (s(x′), s(s(y′′)))
(∀⇒)
H,P (x′, y′′)⇒ P (s(x′), s(s(y′′)))
(cut)
H ⇒ P (s(x′), s(s(y′′)))
The traces along each segment of the proof consist of variables: x, . . . , x′, . . . , x′′ and y, . . . , y′, . . . , y′′.
For any infinite path through the proof, the instances of substitution in the proof (whose premises comprise
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the buds) allow these segments to be ‘glued together’ so as to form an infinitely progressing trace. More
details may be found in [5]. Note that we straightforwardly obtain a proof in GωH= /G
ω
SH=
by simulating the
instances of (case L) with an instance of (case L=) followed by applying paramodulation to each of the
premises.
To show that (2-Hydra) is not provable in the induction-based systems, we demonstrate appropriate
models for each system that satisfy (INDL) but falsify the Hydra statement. Then, by the soundness
in Lemma 5.5 we obtain that the Hydra statement is not provable in the induction-based systems.
The structure underlying the models is that constructed in [5, §4] consisting of a disjoint sum of two
domains, namely the natural numbers and the integers. The constant 0 is interpreted as the zero contained
in the natural numbers, and the interpretation of s is the standard successor function over these domains.
Notice that this structure is not a Herbrand structure for the language over the signature {0, s, P} (nor
is it even a semi-Herbrand structure): it contains a non-standard part consisting of elements that do not
correspond to any closed term of the language (i.e. the integers).
The interpretation of the predicate P in this structure includes all pairs of elements in the domain,
apart from a particular subset of pairs of integers carefully chosen so as to ensure that P still satisfies the
properties defining the induction scheme H . Thus, this interpretation of P does not satisfy (2-Hydra),
since it does not contain all pairs of elements. The pairs of elements ‘missing’ from P all contain at
least one integer (i.e. lie outside the fully Herbrand part of the structure). Indeed, this must be the case
since provability of (2-Hydra) in the cyclic system implies that any interpretation of P satisfying H must
contain all pairs in which both elements are Herbrand for {0, s, P} (i.e. are named by a closed term).
Finally, the results in [5] entail that this model satisfies (INDL) for the signature {0, s, P}. They also
further entail that the extended (normal) model obtained by adding equality also satisfies (INDL) for the
signature {0, s, P,=}. Furthermore, the underlying structure has the properties that the successor function
is injective, and (natural number) zero is not in the image of the successor function. That is, the normal
model also satisfies the conditions in Lemma 5.5(3). Thus, we have that (2-Hydra) is not provable in any
of the systems GINDH , G
IND
SH=
, or GINDH= .
In the language LNAT, where addition, multiplication and equality are taken as relations, and with the
appropriate additional axioms of PA, the cyclic and induction-based systems are equivalent to the implicit
and explicit systems for PA (respectively). Thus, in this case the two systems become equivalent as shown
in [6].7
6 Conclusion and Further Research
In this paper we provided a modular proof-theoretic study of Herbrand logics by considering Herbrand
and semi-Herbrand structures, with and without equality. Sound and complete infinitary sequent-based
proof systems were introduced for the various logics corresponding to two infinitary proof theoretic
approaches. The first adopts an infinite rule and thus results in infinite-width proofs, and the second allows
for non-well-founded proofs that admit the principle of infinite-descent. Sound finitary approximations of
those infinitary systems were given as well, and the connections between them have been investigated. The
adequacy of Herbrand logics as a convenient logical framework is supported by the naturality of the rules
employed in all of these systems. The correspondence between Herbrand structures and the suggested
systems is however non-trivial, as evident by the methods employed in order to achieve completeness.
We have shown that both approaches (infinite-width and infinite-height) are equivalent (for closed
sequents) over languages with a finite number of function symbols. However this equivalence was shown
7This is also true for extensions of the language by new predicates, but not by new function symbols.
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using the completeness theorem, going through the semantics. A first avenue for further research is to
obtain a constructive translation between these two systems that will be purely syntactic. Such a translation
would potentially reveal deeper connections between the approaches.
Further study is required to find appropriate counterparts (whenever such exist) to central proof-
theoretical and meta-logical properties in the context of Herbrand logics. For example, it seems non-trivial
to find a suitable notion of an interpolant that would entail some meaningful version of Craig interpolation.
A possible direction for finding such a notion could potentially be obtained by translation to related
systems [32]. Other standard properties that could be explored in this context are function elimination,
extension by definitions, etc.
The work presented here offers a proof-theoretical interpretation of Herbrand structures that we believe
will lay the foundations for further developments and applications of Herbrand logics that are more
naturally handled proof-theoretically. One such application is in the realm of logic programming (see,
e.g., [28]). The expressiveness of Herbrand logics allows for a finite axiomatization of the minimal model
of any safe stratified logic program [24]. Reasoning about such programs can thus gain from the proof
systems proposed here, by replacing validity checking in the minimal model with efficient proof search,
having the aforementioned axiomatization as the set of premises. Other potential applications of Herbrand
logics are described in [26]. Such applications could also gain from the availability of the corresponding
proof systems presented here.
Lastly, we note that Herbrand structures are a robust concept, not limited only to the usual first-order
structures of classical logic. The structure-definability property embedded in Herbrand logics can be
studied in every logic that employs structures, including first-order modal and temporal logics, intuitionistic
logic, second order logic, many-valued logics and more. Due to the computational aspect of Herbrand
logics, as well as their expressiveness, it seems that the study of Herbrand structures in the context of
computationally useful logics is of special interest for automated reasoning and AI. Two such prominent
logics seem to be intuitionistic first-order logic which by itself already carries constructive computational
content, and ancestral logic (or transitive closure logic) which is an extension of first-order logic that has
been established as a congenial framework for inductive reasoning (see, e.g., [3, 15, 14]).
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